About things that are within our power and those that are not (Discourses 1.1)

The first discourse of our contemplate-a-long of Epictetus' Discourses is one the most powerful, but also one that is poorly understood without reading the primary material

New here? The Discourses ‘Contemplate-A-Long’ is a weekly reading of one discourse from Epictetus’s Discourses. You can learn more about it here, and subscribe below to follow along. Don’t worry if you’re joining late; each discourse is short and easy to read - you’ll catch up in no time.

If you’ve managed to get yourself a copy of Robin Hard’s Oxford World Classics translation of the Discourses, turn it over. The title of this week's discourse is of such importance that it has made its way onto the cover. Epictetus isn’t afraid to unbury his lead. The very first line of the very first book reaches right to the core of Epictetus’s philosophy. It is a fitting beginning because this foundational idea is one of the defining factors of Stoicism.

This remarkable idea isn’t at all unfamiliar. You’ll often hear people tell you not to worry about what you can’t ‘control’. You may even hear this idea more broadly referred to as the Dichotomy of Control, a taxonomy that splits everything into that which can or can not be controlled. However, the word ‘control’ here may do us some harm. It implies an absolutism over our faculties that isn’t represented in the text. The Stoics, as it is now popular to say, did not believe one could have absolute control over their internal state. This is the cost of any philosophy’s popularity. It is diluted as it is hashed and rehashed. So, let us turn to what Epictetus said and unravel what is and isn’t in our power for ourselves.

Epictetus starts by discussing the so-called ‘arts and faculties’ that we possess. If this term is somewhat unclear, the examples should illustrate it well. We might think about it more broadly as the capabilities of the mind. To build houses, to play instruments, to calculate and to draw. There is, however, one unique capability amongst the set of capabilities - reason. You employ the skill of music to play a musical instrument, but what skill do you employ when considering the ‘skill of music itself’? When deciding whether the skill is worthy or should be practiced now? That is the faculty of reason.

It is the case that for all capabilities other than reason, when we ask what is the faculty that examines it, we get the answer of reason. Reason is even more special than that, though. What allows us to examine reason itself? Reason again. Reason can examine all other faculties and itself. It is the only such capability. This places it as the supreme faculty in Epictetus’s taxonomy of human capability.

If you’ve read any other Greek philosopher, such as Plato and Aristotle, you’ll recognise this emphasis on reason as the supreme human ideal. It’s a prominent feature of both The Republic and The Nichomachean Ethics. Their reasoning concerns the various parts of the soul, the soul being something like ‘consciousness’ for the more materially inclined. The separations differ by thinker, but the soul is generally separated into the rational, the irrational and the appetitive. The first two need little explanation, but the ‘appetitive’ is more challenging to parse. I understand it as desire. You can desire what is good (the rational part) and what is evil (the irrational part). Reason is the faculty that directs your desire towards the good and avoids your more base temptations.

This is what Epictetus means by impression. I read impression as ‘thought’, distinct from sense impressions. This is highlighted in the example of the gold object. Seeing gold is just sense data, but your impressions tell you if it is beautiful. There is a hidden premise in the text here - that gold is beautiful. It’s worth taking a minute to consider the impression of beauty we get from gold, how it relates to what is rational and what that has to do with what Epictetus calls the ‘right use’ of impressions.

Let’s take it as true that gold is beautiful—a reasonable position. If you have the impression that gold is beautiful, then it is reasonable to take action based on this impression. We have the impression that gold is beautiful, gold is beautiful, and so we make ‘right use’ of an impression. In the other case, if we have the impression that gold is not beautiful, then it would be unreasonable to act. The truth and our impressions are distinct, and we use reason to know when they are and aren’t aligned.

The Dichotomy of Control isn’t control over our thoughts. It’s control over what we do about our thoughts. This requires two preconditions. One, we know what the truth is. Two, we should take time to contemplate on our impressions instead of acting instinctively. Epictetus’s dialogue with Zeus promises that if we turn ourselves to the pursuit of reason above all else, we will be free from disturbance. Disturbance should be read here in its broadest possible terms - life's minor and major pains. What is and isn’t in our power comes to our aid in small matters - when the wind doesn’t blow for sailing - but also in times of extreme jeopardy, like our impending execution.

The most fundamental of all truths is that which is or isn’t in our power. All that is granted to our power is the right use of our impressions. Everything else lies beyond it. The weather, work, fortune, fame, popularity, love, health, safety and anything else you can name. Be careful. It is easy to misinterpret this point. It does not mean you should do nothing to ensure your health or relationships. But instead of pursuing them directly, pursue reason, and the rest will follow. And when the winds of fate blow against you, you shall remember as Rufus does that no matter how we act, we don’t get to choose what is granted to us, only to choose to be contented with it. As Epictetus tells us, if we have to die, do we have to die groaning?

Epictetus describes his body as a poor, wretched thing. A thing he is shackled to. This evocative language we imagine was inspired by his personal history as a slave. He walked with a characteristic limp. The historical record can’t agree on what exactly happened to his leg, but we can imagine it brought him discomfort. There isn’t anything quite like chronic pain that will inspire you to let go of what is not yours to control.

The Stoics used description to remind them that the things they held most dear were not as they appeared. Epictetus describes the body as nothing more than ‘cleverly molded clay’. Aurelius, in the Meditations describes his royal purple cloak as mere sheep wool, dyed with shellfish. This is a practical tool that you can begin to practice. A flash sports car or a Rolex watch is nothing more than metal and glass. When you pull back the curtain on your desires, they vanish.

In just two pages, we’ve had a passing glimpse at many different ideas: the body, the soul, fate, what is worth pursuing and what is or isn’t in our power. There are some yet unanswered philosophical questions. Do we, alone, possess reason? Does reason lead to a necessary state of suffering? Do we ‘own’ our bodies, as Epictetus suggests we don’t in the final line? These questions hint at the course we may chart in the coming pages. The discourses vary in the extent of their practical application. However, Discourse 1.1 is by far one of the most useful. Be the sailor that waits for the wind, not the one who worries about it.

I hope you’ve enjoyed our first foray into this seminal work. We continue next week with Discourse 1.2, How one may preserve one’s proper character in everything. If you're new and want to follow along, subscribe below to get all the essays. If you’ve made it this far, why don’t you contemplate the following question? Let me know your thoughts in the comments below.

What does Epictetus mean when he says our body doesn’t belong to us? Does it belong to anyone? How is this useful?